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The Use of the Logit Model in Applied Industrial Organization

Author

Listed:
  • Gregory Werden
  • Luke Froeb
  • Timothy Tardiff

Abstract

Qualitative choice models, such as the logit model, can capture important firm and product asymmetries. This paper surveys use of the logit model in industrial organization, with special focus on its application to merger analysis. The basic model and its motivation are reviewed, as is its estimation. Discussed in some detail is the use of the logit model to predict the price and welfare effects of horizontal mergers in differentiated products industries. Simulation using a qualitative choice model is argued to be far superior to traditional structural analysis. Logit merger simulations have the particular virtues of low informational and computational burdens and the use of the logit model can be motivated as reflecting a diffuse prior on the structure of demand.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory Werden & Luke Froeb & Timothy Tardiff, 1996. "The Use of the Logit Model in Applied Industrial Organization," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 83-105.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:3:y:1996:i:1:p:83-105
    DOI: 10.1080/758533490
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gregory J. WERDEN, 1997. "Simulating The Effects Of Differentiated Products Mergers: A Practitioners' Guide," Department of Resource Economics Regional Research Project 967, University of Massachusetts.
    2. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2010. "Merger Simulation In Competition Policy: A Survey," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 277-319.
    3. Gaynor, Martin & Vogt, William B, 2003. " Competition among Hospitals," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(4), pages 764-785, Winter.
    4. Lundmark, Robert & Wårell, Linda, 2008. "Horizontal mergers in the iron ore industry--An application of PCAIDS," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 129-141, September.
    5. Hausman, Jerry A. & Leonard, Gregory K., 2007. "Estimation of patent licensing value using a flexible demand specification," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 242-258, August.
    6. Dubin, Jeffrey A., 2007. "Valuing intangible assets with a nested logit market share model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 285-302, August.
    7. Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc, 2016. "An Evaluation of the Degree of Competition in the French Life Insurance Industry," TSE Working Papers 16-697, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    8. Philip Crooke & Luke Froeb & Steven Tschantz & Gregory Werden, 1999. "Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 15(3), pages 205-217, November.
    9. Alan Marco & Gordon Rausser, 2011. "Complementarities and spillovers in mergers: an empirical investigation using patent data," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(3), pages 207-231.
    10. Gregory Werden & Luke Froeb & James Langenfeld, 2000. "Lost Profits from Patent Infringement: The Simulation Approach," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 213-227.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Quantitative Choice; Mergers; Antitrust; JEL classifications: D43; L25; L4;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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