IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/dbrrns/21.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Der "more economic approach" in der EU-Fusionskontrolle - eine kritische Würdigung

Author

Listed:
  • Christiansen, Arndt

Abstract

Mit dem "more economic approach" wird ein neuer Ansatz in der EU-Fusionskontrolle verfolgt. Die Zielsetzung einer (besseren) ökonomischen Fundierung ist ausdrücklich zu begrüßen. Allerdings zeigt die genauere Analyse, dass faktisch die Rechtssicherheit verringert wird, während die Auswirkungen auf die Entscheidungsqualität zumindest unklar bleiben. Gleichzeitig ist eine deutliche Zunahme des (Verfahrens-)Aufwandes zu konstatieren. Hinzu kommen wichtige institutionelle Implikationen, die bisher weitgehend unberücksichtigt geblieben sind. Im Ergebnis ist daher ein breiteres Verständnis von ökonomischer Fundierung notwendig. Als Handlungsempfehlungen ergeben sich die Unabhängigkeit der Wettbewerbsbehörde und die stärkere Regelorientierung der Fusionskontrolle.

Suggested Citation

  • Christiansen, Arndt, 2005. "Der "more economic approach" in der EU-Fusionskontrolle - eine kritische Würdigung," Research Notes 21, Deutsche Bank Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:dbrrns:21
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/21883/1/PROD0000000000195710.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heyes, Anthony G, 2003. "Expert Advice and Regulatory Complexity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 119-133, September.
    2. Richard A. Posner, 1999. "The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 91-99, Spring.
    3. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    4. Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2002. "Reforming European Merger Review: Targeting Problem Areas in Policy Outcomes," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 311-364, December.
    5. Bagwell, Kyle & Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Game theory and industrial organization," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pages 1851-1895, Elsevier.
    6. Alan Carruth & Andy Dickerson & Andrew Henley, 2000. "What do We Know About Investment Under Uncertainty?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 119-154, April.
    7. Capps Jr., Oral & Church, Jeffrey & Alan Love, H., 2003. "Specification issues and confidence intervals in unilateral price effects analysis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 3-31, March.
    8. Schmalensee, Richard, 1987. "Horizontal Merger Policy: Problems and Changes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 41-54, Fall.
    9. Ivaldi, Marc & Verboven, Frank, 2005. "Quantifying the effects from horizontal mergers in European competition policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 669-691, December.
    10. Budzinski, Oliver & Christiansen, Andt, 2005. "Competence Allocation in the EU Competition Policy System as an Interest-Driven Process," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 313-337, December.
    11. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    12. Stefan Voigt & André Schmidt, 2005. "Making European Merger Policy More Predictable," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-1-4020-3090-1, November.
    13. Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, 1998. "Does it matter that the prosecutor is also the judge? The administrative complaint process at the Federal Trade Commission," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(1), pages 1-11.
    14. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 257-286, January.
    15. Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "Competition Policy With Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead Of “Per Se Rules Vs Rule Of Reason”," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 215-244.
    16. Baumol, William J & Ordover, Janusz A, 1985. "Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 247-265, May.
    17. Israel M. Kirzner, 1997. "Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 60-85, March.
    18. Brunetti, Aymo & Kisunko, Gregory & Weder, Beatrice, 1998. "Credibility of Rules and Economic Growth: Evidence from a Worldwide Survey of the Private Sector," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 12(3), pages 353-384, September.
    19. Palumbo, Giuliana, 2001. "Trial procedures and optimal limits on proof-taking10," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 309-327, September.
    20. Bruce R. Lyons, 2004. "Reform of European Merger Policy," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 246-261, May.
    21. Scully, Gerald W, 1997. "Rule and Policy Spaces and Economic Progress: Lessons for Third World Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 311-324, March.
    22. Mahoney, Paul G, 2001. "The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 503-525, Part I Ju.
    23. Werden, Gregory J & Froeb, Luke M, 1994. "The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 407-426, October.
    24. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414, Elsevier.
    25. Franklin M. Fisher, 1989. "Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 113-124, Spring.
    26. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, March.
    27. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    28. Götz Drauz, 2002. "A View from Inside the Merger Task Force: Comments on “Reforming European Merger Review: Targeting Problem Areas in Policy Outcomes”," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 391-399, December.
    29. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
    30. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Oliver Budzinski & Arndt Christiansen, 2007. "The Oracle/PeopleSoft Case: Unilateral Effects, Simulation Models and Econometrics in Contemporary Merger Control," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200702, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    2. Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Unilateral Effects," IDEI Working Papers 222, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    3. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, January.
    4. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    5. Amir, Rabah & Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Xue, Licun, 2009. "Merger performance under uncertain efficiency gains," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 264-273, March.
    6. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2010. "Merger Simulation In Competition Policy: A Survey," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 277-319.
    7. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    8. Spector, David, 2003. "Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1591-1600, December.
    9. Valentiny, Pál, 2019. "Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban [Forensic economics]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 134-162.
    10. Jovanovic, Dragan, 2013. "Mergers, managerial incentives, and efficiencies," DICE Discussion Papers 88, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    11. Brennan, Timothy J., 2000. "The Economics of Competition Policy: Recent Developments and Cautionary Notes in Antitrust and Regulation," Discussion Papers 10716, Resources for the Future.
    12. Chen, Jiawei, 2009. "The effects of mergers with dynamic capacity accumulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 92-109, January.
    13. Jingang Zhao, 2009. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal number of firms," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(3), pages 235-246, December.
    14. Kenneth Flamm, 1993. "Semiconductor Dependency and Strategic Trade Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1 Microec), pages 249-333.
    15. Marie Goppelsroeder & Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra, 2008. "Quantifying The Scope For Efficiency Defense In Merger Control: The Werden‐Froeb‐Index," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 778-808, December.
    16. Farrell Joseph & Shapiro Carl, 2010. "Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-41, March.
    17. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Johan Stennek & Frank Verboven, 2006. "Efficiency Gains from Mergers," Chapters, in: Fabienne IIzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn (ed.), European Merger Control, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Höffler, Felix & Kranz, Sebastian, 2011. "Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 576-588, September.
    19. Jovanovic, Dragan & Wey, Christian, 2014. "Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeovers, and merger control," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 32-35.
    20. Zhang, Anming, 2005. "Competition Models of Strategic Alliances," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-100, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wettbewerbspolitik; EU-Fusionskontrolle; ökonomische Analyse;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:dbrrns:21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dbresde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.