Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences
This paper addresses the effect of horizontal mergers on prices. It is shown that if firms compete in quantities and marginal costs are nondecreasing, any profitable merger failing to generate technological synergies must harm consumers through higher prices, irrespective of entry conditions in the industry. However this result does not hold if products are differentiated and firms compete in prices. The implications for merger policy are discussed.
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Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 10 (December)
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References listed on IDEAS
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