Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences
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- Spector, David, 2002. "Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 0206, CEPREMAP.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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