Structural remedies in merger regulation in a Cournot framework
To prevent possible abuse of market power in the future an antitrust agency can force merging firms to divest some of their assets. The divested assets can be sold via auction either to existing competitors or to a new entrant. Divesture of assets extends the range of parameters when a merger satisfies a consumer surplus standard and should be approved. If the agency takes a more active stance toward the selection of a purchase of the assets, then it could lead to a favorable outcome for consumers and merging firms.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 882, Politickych veznu 7, 111 21 Praha 1|
Phone: (+420) 224 005 123
Fax: (+420) 224 005 333
Web page: http://www.cerge-ei.cz
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- McAfee, R Preston & Williams, Michael A, 1992. "Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 181-87, June.
- Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
- Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, November.
- Damien J. NEVEN & Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER, 2000.
"Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
00.24, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Neven, Damien J. & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2005. "Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 829-848, December.
- Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2000. "Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Neven, Damien J & Röller, Lars-Hendrik, 2000. "Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 2620, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521816632, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp229. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jana Koudelkova)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.