Merger and product range rivalry
The received literature concludes that if scale economies are absent, mergers are often unprofitable under Cornot competition, but always profitable under Bertrand. In a linear demand model with three firms initially, where there are two merger candidates, we show that results will change if we introduce the number of brands as a choice variable.
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