Merging with a buyer group member
We examine a merger between a national retailer and a local retailer who is a member of a buyer group. While the traditional literature on mergers assumes an oligopolistic industry (where the merger takes place) supplied by a perfectly competitive one, we assume here that retailers obtain their input from a supplier that can offer quantity discounts. In this setting, a merger can be profitable for insiders (solving the merger paradox) and can also be more profitable for insiders than for outsiders (solving the free-riding problem). This result holds even if the merged firm ends-up with a small share of the market. However, welfare decreases post-merger. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Volume (Year): 30 (2009)
Issue (Month): 7 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Spector, David, 2003.
"Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1591-1600, December.
- Spector, David, 2002. "Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 0206, CEPREMAP.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
- Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers 17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume, Odd Rune & Sorgard, Lars, 2005. "Downstream merger with upstream market power," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 717-743, April.
- Esther Gal-Or, 1999. "Mergers and Exclusionary Practices in Health Care Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 315-350, 09.
- Blair,Roger D. & Lafontaine,Francine, 2011. "The Economics of Franchising," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521775892, February.
- Blair,Roger D. & Lafontaine,Francine, 2005. "The Economics of Franchising," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521772525.
- Pesendorfer, Martin, 2003. " Horizontal Mergers in the Paper Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 495-515, Autumn.
- Martin Pesendorfer, 1998. "Horizontal Mergers in the Paper Industry," NBER Working Papers 6751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-227, March.
- Tasneem Chipty & Christopher M. Snyder, 1999. "The Role Of Firm Size In Bilateral Bargaining: A Study Of The Cable Television Industry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(2), pages 326-340, May.
- Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 1997. "Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 418-430, March.
- Anthony Creane & Carl Davidson, 2004. "Multidivisional firms, internal competition, and the merger paradox," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(4), pages 951-977, November.
- Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2007. "Buyer power and supplier incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 647-667, April.
- Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2002. "Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3547, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Roman Inderst & Christian Wey, 2005. "Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 464, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Roman Inderst & Christian Wey, 2003. "Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-05, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Daughety, Andrew F, 1990. "Beneficial Concentration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1231-1237, December.
- Hallam, Arne, 1999. "Industrial Organization: Contemporary Theory and Practice (Instructor's Manual--Text by L. Pepall, D. J. Richards, and G. Norman)," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5310, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Paul W. Dobson & Michael Waterson & Stephen W. Davies, 2003. "The Patterns and Implications of Increasing Concentration in European Food Retailing," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 111-125.
- Morton I. Kamien & Israel Zang, 1990. "The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 465-499.
- Sreya Kolay & Greg Shaffer & Janusz A. Ordover, 2004. "All-Units Discounts in Retail Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 429-459, 09.
- Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:7:p:481-490. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.