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Concentration horizontale et relations verticales

  • Marie-Laure Allain

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Saïd Souam

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - INSEE - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique)

Cet article explore les effets des concentrations horizontales dans des marchés reliés verticalement. Dans un modèle de concurrence imparfaite à deux niveaux, où les transactions verticales se font par l'intermédiaire d'un marché, on montre que des fusions horizontales engendrant des effets de taille sont, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, plus profitables en aval qu'en amont. De plus, la concentration dans un secteur réduit les incitations à la fusion dans l'autre secteur. Ces résultats sont confirmés par l'analyse d'un jeu de fusion permettant d'endogénéiser le processus de concentration.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00242914.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242914
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00242914/en/
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  1. Morton I. Kamien & Israel Zang, 1988. "The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition," Discussion Papers 802, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1993. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double Marginalisation," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9308, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
  3. McAfee, R Preston & Williams, Michael A, 1992. "Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 181-87, June.
  4. Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 1997. "Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 418-30, March.
  5. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. " Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  6. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March.
  7. Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers 17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  8. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
  9. Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo, 2001. "Upstream mergers, downstream mergers, and secret vertical contracts," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 275-289, September.
  10. Salinger, Michael A, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-56, May.
  11. Ramón Faulí-Oller, 1997. "On merger profitability in a cournot setting," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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  13. Andrea Bonaccorsi & Paola Giuri, 2000. "The long term evolution of vertically-related industries," LEM Papers Series 2000/01, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
  14. Horn, H. & Wolinsky, A., 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies And Incentives For Merger," Papers 410, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  15. Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W., 1992. "Mergers of producers of perfect complements competing in price," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 359-364, July.
  16. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
  17. Lionel Janin & Benoît Menoni, 2005. "Le Contrôle des concentrations en France : Une analyse empirique des avis du Conseil de la Concurrence," Working Papers 2005-37, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
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