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Concentration horizontale et relations verticales

  • Marie-Laure Allain

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS - Polytechnique - X)

  • Saïd Souam

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - INSEE - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique)

This paper analyzes the effects of horizontal mergers in vertically related industries. In a successive oligopoly model with an intermediate market, we show that horizontal mergers creating size effects are relatively more profitable downstream than upstream. Furthermore, concentration in an industry reduces the incentives to merge in the vertically related industries. These results hold in a merger game endogenising the merger process.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00242914.

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Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242914
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  1. Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, 09.
  2. Marie-Laure Allain & Saïd Souam, 2007. "Concentration Horizontale et Relations Verticales," CEPN Working Papers hal-00143920, HAL.
  3. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. " Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  4. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
  5. repec:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:2:p:465-99 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
  7. Fauli-Oller, Ramon, 1997. "On merger profitability in a Cournot setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 75-79, January.
  8. Ramón Faulí-Oller, 1997. "On merger profitability in a cournot setting," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  9. Lionel Janin & Benoît Menoni, 2005. "Le Contrôle des concentrations en France : Une analyse empirique des avis du Conseil de la Concurrence," Working Papers 2005-37, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  10. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March.
  11. Bonaccorsi, Andrea & Giuri, Paola, 2001. "The long-term evolution of vertically-related industries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(7), pages 1053-1083, July.
  12. Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo, 2001. "Upstream mergers, downstream mergers, and secret vertical contracts," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 275-289, September.
  13. Steffen Ziss, 2005. "Horizontal mergers and successive oligopoly," Working Papers eg0041, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
  14. Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W., 1992. "Mergers of producers of perfect complements competing in price," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 359-364, July.
  15. Horn, H. & Wolinsky, A., 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies And Incentives For Merger," Papers 410, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  16. McAfee, R Preston & Williams, Michael A, 1992. "Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 181-87, June.
  17. repec:oup:qjecon:v:103:y:1988:i:2:p:345-56 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 1997. "Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 418-30, March.
  19. repec:oup:qjecon:v:98:y:1983:i:2:p:185-99 is not listed on IDEAS
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