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Capital Accumulation and Horizontal Mergers in Differential Oligopoly Games

  • R. Cellini
  • L. Lambertini

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Paper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number 477.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:477
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  1. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Non-Linear Marcket Demand and Capital Accumulation in A Differential Oligopoly Game," Working Papers 372, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  2. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
  3. Kwoka, John Jr., 1989. "The private profitability of horizontal mergers with non-Cournot and Maverick behavior," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 403-411.
  4. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca, 1998. "A Dynamic Model of Differentiated Oligopoly with Capital Accumulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 145-155, November.
  5. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2001. "Differential Oligopoly Games where the Closed-Loop Memoryless and Open-Loop Equilibria Coincide," Working Papers 402, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  6. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
  7. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March.
  8. McAfee, R Preston & Williams, Michael A, 1992. "Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 181-87, June.
  9. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
  10. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
  11. Fauli-Oller, Ramon, 1997. "On merger profitability in a Cournot setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 75-79, January.
  12. Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W, 1991. "Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 658-65, June.
  13. Reynolds, Stanley S, 1987. "Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(1), pages 69-88, February.
  14. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2002. "Price vs Quantity in a Dynamic Duopoly Game with Capacity Accumulation," Working Papers 449, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  15. David Hennessy, 2000. "Cournot Oligopoly Conditions under which Any Horizontal Merger Is Profitable," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 277-284, November.
  16. Cheung, Francis K., 1992. "Two remarks on the equilibrium analysis of horizontal merger," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 119-123, September.
  17. Ramón Faulí-Oller, 1997. "On merger profitability in a cournot setting," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  18. Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-64, September.
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