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Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework

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  • Andrei Medvedev

    (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)

Abstract

To prevent possible abuse of market power, an antitrust agency can force merging firms to divest some of their assets. The divested assets can be sold via auction either to existing competitors or to a new entrant. Divestiture of assets extends the range of parameters when a merger satisfies a consumer surplus standard and should be approved. If the agency takes a more active stance toward the selection of a purchaser of the assets (e.g. to exclude an incumbent from the auction), then it could lead to a favourable outcome for consumers and merging firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrei Medvedev, 2007. "Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework," Working Papers 07-16, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
  • Handle: RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp07-16
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    File URL: http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP07-16.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Florent Venayre, 2015. "L'efficacité du pouvoir ultramarin d'injonction structurelle en question," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-50, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    2. Patrice Bougette & Florent Venayre, 2008. "Contrôles a priori et a posteriori des concentrations : comment augmenter l'efficacité des politiques de concurrence," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 9-40.
    3. Cosnita, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2009. "Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 188-196, March.
    4. Bougette, Patrice, 2010. "Preventing merger unilateral effects: A Nash-Cournot approach to asset divestitures," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 162-174, September.
    5. Thibaud Vergé, 2010. "Horizontal Mergers, Structural Remedies, And Consumer Welfare In A Cournot Oligopoly With Assets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 723-741, December.
    6. Mariana Cunha & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2018. "Sequential Mergers and Antitrust Authority’s Decisions in Stackelberg Markets," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 373-394, September.
    7. Helder Vasconcelos, 2010. "Efficiency Gains And Structural Remedies In Merger Control," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 742-766, December.
    8. Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt & Christian Wey, 2016. "Merger Remedies in Oligopoly under a Consumer Welfare Standard," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 150-179.
    9. Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Wey, Christian, 2016. "Structural remedies as a signaling device," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 1-6.
    10. Patrice Bougette, 2011. "Négociation d'engagements en matière de concentrations : une perspective d'économiste," Post-Print halshs-00580669, HAL.
    11. Emilie Dargaud, 2013. "Horizontal mergers, efficiency gains and remedies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 349-372, October.
    12. Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Wey, Christian, 2014. "Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100397, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt & Christian Wey, 2021. "Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-12, August.
    14. Christian Steiner & Kai Hüschelrath & Jürgen Weigand, 2011. "Merger remedies involving restructuring costs in a Cournot framework," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 417-434, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Merger regulation; structural remedies; divestiture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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