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Structural Remedies in Merger Regulation in a Cournot Framework

  • Andrei Medvedev

    ()

    (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)

To prevent possible abuse of market power, an antitrust agency can force merging firms to divest some of their assets. The divested assets can be sold via auction either to existing competitors or to a new entrant. Divestiture of assets extends the range of parameters when a merger satisfies a consumer surplus standard and should be approved. If the agency takes a more active stance toward the selection of a purchaser of the assets (e.g. to exclude an incumbent from the auction), then it could lead to a favourable outcome for consumers and merging firms.

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File URL: http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP07-16.pdf
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Paper provided by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in its series Working Papers with number 07-16.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp07-16
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  1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816632 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Damien J. NEVEN & Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER, 2000. "Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.24, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  3. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
  4. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521016919 is not listed on IDEAS
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