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Négociation d'engagements en matière de concentrations : une perspective d'économiste

  • Patrice Bougette


    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis [UNS] - CNRS : UMR6227)

Cet article a pour objectif d'étudier la dimension économique de la négociation dans le cadre du contrôle des concentrations, en s'appuyant sur les derniers résultats de la littérature. Après avoir rappelé la typologie classique des engagements utilisés dans ce cadre, nous détaillons les enjeux de la négociation entre parties et autorité de la concurrence. L'arbitrage entre sévérité des engagements proposés, gains d'efficacité attendus du projet et durée de la procédure est au centre du processus de négociation. Enfin, la mesure de la réussite de la négociation permet de fournir des pistes pour mettre en œuvre les engagements dans les meilleures conditions.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00580669.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Revue Internationale de Droit Economique, 2011, 4, Les Dossiers, 111-124
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00580669
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  1. Vasconcelos, Helder, 2007. "Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 6093, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  5. Jo Seldeslachts & Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, 2009. "Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 607-634, 08.
  6. Cosnita, A. & Tropeano, J.P., 2008. "Negotiating remedies : revealing the merger efficiency gains," Working Papers 200803, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
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  8. Christopher T. Taylor & Daniel S. Hosken, 2007. "THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE MARATHON-ASHLAND JOINT VENTURE: THE IMPORTANCE OF INDUSTRY SUPPLY SHOCKS AND VERTICAL MARKET STRUCTURE -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 419-451, 09.
  9. Patrice Bougette, 2010. "Preventing Merger Unilateral Effects: A Nash–Cournot Approach to Asset Divestitures," Post-Print halshs-00477164, HAL.
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  11. Patrice Bougette & Stéphane Turolla, 2008. "Market structures, political surroundings, and merger remedies: an empirical investigation of the EC’s decisions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 125-150, April.
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