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Négociation d'engagements en matière de concentrations : une perspective d'économiste


  • Patrice Bougette

    () (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)


This article aims at studying the economic dimension of the bargaining process in merger control by using the latest results from the literature. After recalling the classic typology of merger remedies, we look at what is at stake in the negotiation between merging parties and the competition authority. The tradeoff between merger remedies, efficiency gains expected from the file, and the length of the authority's investigation is at the core of the bargaining process. Lastly, assessing the success of the negotiation provides insight into how to best implement merger remedies.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Bougette, 2011. "Négociation d'engagements en matière de concentrations : une perspective d'économiste," Post-Print halshs-00580669, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00580669
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jo Seldeslachts & Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, 2009. "Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 607-634, August.
    2. Helder Vasconcelos, 2010. "Efficiency Gains And Structural Remedies In Merger Control," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 742-766, December.
    3. Christopher T. Taylor & Daniel S. Hosken, 2007. "THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE MARATHON-ASHLAND JOINT VENTURE: THE IMPORTANCE OF INDUSTRY SUPPLY SHOCKS AND VERTICAL MARKET STRUCTURE -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 419-451, September.
    4. Andrei Medvedev, 2004. "Structural remedies in merger regulation in a Cournot framework," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp229, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    5. Bougette, Patrice, 2010. "Preventing merger unilateral effects: A Nash-Cournot approach to asset divestitures," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 162-174, September.
    6. Cosnita, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2009. "Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 188-196, March.
    7. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea, 2015. "Success and failure of bargaining in merger control: The case of asset divestitures," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 254-259.
    8. Bruce Lyons & Andrei Medvedev, 2007. "Bargaining over Remedies in Merger Regulation," Working Papers 07-3, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
    9. Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    10. Lucile Fréneaux, 2007. "L'efficacité du recours aux engagements en matière de contrôle des concentrations," Revue internationale de droit économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 43-67.
    11. Patrice Bougette & Stéphane Turolla, 2008. "Market structures, political surroundings, and merger remedies: an empirical investigation of the EC’s decisions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 125-150, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Florent Venayre, 2015. "L'efficacité du pouvoir ultramarin d'injonction structurelle en question," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-50, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.

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    Engagements; Négociation; Concentrations;

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