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L'efficacité du recours aux engagements en matière de contrôle des concentrations


  • Lucile Fréneaux


The definition of proper remedies has become an essential feature of the merger control. For the past ten years, commitments made by the merging parties have been used more and more frequently in both French and European law. The question is whether the use of such commitments as remedies is efficient. Efficiency is, indeed, the main concern of competition authorities, as shown by a recent study of the European Commission which focuses on the various causes of the ineffectiveness of remedies. On one hand, competition authorities try to enhance the effectiveness of commitments as remedies by imposing a strict framework for the acceptance of commitments. More particularly, the acceptance of commitments is based on a negotiation between the undertakings, competition authorities and third parties which has to succeed within an mandatory period of time. In this process, competition authorities have to make sure that the commitments made will, in fact, restore competition. On the other, competition authorities seek to ensure the correct implementation of remedies during both the negotiation process and subsequently when the commitments are executed. Ultimately, the competition authorities’ decision is subject to judicial control.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucile Fréneaux, 2007. "L'efficacité du recours aux engagements en matière de contrôle des concentrations," Revue internationale de droit économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 43-67.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:riddbu:ride_211_0043

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    Cited by:

    1. Patrice Bougette, 2011. "Négociation d'engagements en matière de concentrations : une perspective d'économiste," Post-Print halshs-00580669, HAL.

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    merger control; remedies; effectiveness;


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