Horizontal Mergers, Structural Remedies and Consumer Welfare in a Cournot Oligopoly with Assets
Competition authorities sometimes require that firms divest some of their assets to rivalsin order to allow a merger to take place. This paper extends the results of Farrell andShapiro [1990a] and shows that, in the absence of technological synergies, a merger ishighly unlikely to benefit consumers, even if it is subjected to appropriate structuralremedies. For instance, a merger may ultimately lead to a lower price only if at leasttwo different firms acquire the divested assets, and if the merging parties had relativelyimportant pre-merger market shares.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri 92245 Malakoff Cedex|
Phone: 01 41 17 60 81
Web page: http://www.crest.fr
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2009-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Florian Sallaberry)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.