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Contrôles a priori et a posteriori des concentrations : comment augmenter l'efficacité des politiques de concurrence ?

  • Patrice Bougette

    ()

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS)

  • Florent Venayre

    ()

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - Centre international de hautes études agronomiques méditerranéennes [CIHEAM])

En France, la récente affaire de l'eau semble sonner le glas du contrôle a posteriori des concentrations. L'objectif de cet article est de souligner pourtant l'intérêt de ce type de contrôle en montrant son rôle crucial pour les autorités de concurrence comme complément du système actuel des notifications. En présentant les limites d'un contrôle exclusivement ex-ante, nous montrons que la possibilité d'agir ex-post sur les structures du marché pourrait engendrer des comportements plus vertueux dans le contrôle amont en réduisant les effets de sélection adverse. Le contrôle a posteriori permettrait également une action positive sur les comportements des acteurs une fois la fusion réalisée, qu'il s'agisse des stratégies des firmes ou des nouvelles possibilités offertes aux autorités en matière d'incitations comportementales. Malgré ces effets favorables, la mise en œuvre d'un contrôle a posteriori des concentrations doit être abordée avec précaution car se poseraient en particulier des problèmes de sécurité juridique. Ces derniers pourraient cependant être compensés par une affirmation de la compétence du Conseil de la concurrence en matière de concentration.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00463953.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Publication status: Published in Revue d Economie Industrielle -Paris- Editions Techniques et Economiques-, Publiee Avec le Concours du C.N.R.S., 2008, 121, pp.9-40
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00463953
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00463953
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