IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-01889496.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Échanges d'informations : les jurisprudences française et communautaire à l'aune des prédictions théoriques

Author

Listed:
  • Florent Venayre

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract

One sometimes reproaches the information sharing literature for using static models which do not allow to take into account the mechanisms highlighted by the literature on dynamic collusion. Nevertheless, the static literature provides very interesting results on the impact of information sharing on competition, which are likely to help efficiently antitrust authorities. This article proposes a complete and original study of French and European jurisprudences and shows that information exchanges actually observed, occur on markets which correspond to the theoretical predictions of static models. Consequences in antitrust policy parlance are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Florent Venayre, 2004. "Échanges d'informations : les jurisprudences française et communautaire à l'aune des prédictions théoriques," Post-Print halshs-01889496, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01889496
    DOI: 10.3406/rei.2004.3060
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01889496
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01889496/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/rei.2004.3060?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Esther Gal-or, 1986. "Information Transmission—Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 85-92.
    2. Maura P. Doyle & Christopher M. Snyder, 1999. "Information Sharing and Competition in the Motor Vehicle Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1326-1364, December.
    3. Jin, Jim Y, 1994. "Information Sharing through Sales Report," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 323-333, September.
    4. Stennek, J., 1997. "Coordination in Oligopoly," Papers 634, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    5. Stennek, Johan, 1997. " Coordination in Oligopoly," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 541-554, December.
    6. Dov Fried, 1984. "Incentives for Information Production and Disclosure in a Duopolistic Environment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(2), pages 367-381.
    7. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
    8. Patrizio Bianchi, 1991. "Politique antitrust et politique de la concurrence dans le contexte européen (première partie)," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 56(1), pages 7-26.
    9. Johan Stennek, 1997. "Coordination in Oligopoly," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 541-554, December.
    10. Patrizio Bianchi, 1992. "Politique antitrust et politique de la concurrence dans le contexte européen - Seconde partie : les politiques anti-trust aux États-Unis et en Europe," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 60(1), pages 7-28.
    11. William Novshek & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1982. "Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 214-218, Spring.
    12. Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(3), pages 433-446.
    13. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Patrice Bougette & Florent Venayre, 2008. "Contrôles a priori et a posteriori des concentrations : comment augmenter l'efficacité des politiques de concurrence," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 9-40.
    2. Patrice Bougette & Florent Venayre, 2006. "L'adaptation légale de la stratégie d'entreprise aux contraintes du droit de la concurrence," Post-Print halshs-00482177, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
    2. Chun‐Hao Chang & Arun J. Prakash & Shu Yeh, 2004. "Sale of monopoly information and behavior of rivaling clients: A theoretical perspective," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(3), pages 283-304.
    3. Chang, Chun-Hao & Prakash, Arun J. & Yeh, Shu, 2004. "Sale of monopoly information and behavior of rivaling clients: A theoretical perspective," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 283-304.
    4. Jin, Jim Y., 1996. "A test for information sharing in Cournot oligopoly," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 75-86, March.
    5. Pedro M. Gardete, 2016. "Competing Under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Dynamic Random Access Memory Manufacturing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(11), pages 3291-3309, November.
    6. Piccolo, Salvatore & Pagnozzi, Marco, 2013. "Information sharing between vertical hierarchies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 201-222.
    7. Bacchetta, Philippe & Espinosa, Maria Paz, 1995. "Information sharing and tax competition among governments," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 103-121, August.
    8. David Spector, 2021. "Market share transparency, signaling and welfare: Cournot and Bertrand," PSE Working Papers halshs-02946654, HAL.
    9. António Brandão & Joana Pinho, 2015. "Asymmetric Information And Exchange Of Information About Product Differentiation," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 166-185, April.
    10. Lowell Johnson, 1997. "The Incentive of Cournot Duopolists to Reveal Cost Information After Costs are Realized," Departmental Working Papers 199704, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    11. Medín, J. Andrés Faíña & Rodríguez, Jesús López & Rodríguez, José López, 2003. "Information Exchanges in Cournot Duopolies," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 57(1), January.
    12. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Shin, Jhinyoung, 1999. "Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 109-135, January.
    13. Dolores Alepuz, M. & Urbano, Amparo, 1999. "Duopoly experimentation: Cournot competition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 165-188, March.
    14. Karakoç, Gülen & Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2022. "The value of transparency in dynamic contracting with entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    15. Haim Mendelson & Tunay I. Tunca, 2007. "Strategic Spot Trading in Supply Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(5), pages 742-759, May.
    16. Sjaak Hurkens, 2014. "Bayesian Nash equilibrium in “linear” Cournot models with private information about costs," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 203-217, June.
    17. Juan-José Ganuza & Jos Jansen, 2013. "Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 845-876, December.
    18. Hyoduk Shin & Tunay I. Tunca, 2010. "Do Firms Invest in Forecasting Efficiently? The Effect of Competition on Demand Forecast Investments and Supply Chain Coordination," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(6), pages 1592-1610, December.
    19. Yasuhiro Sakai, 2016. "Information Exchanges among Firms and Their Welfare Implications (Part 2) : Alternative Duopoly Models with Different Types of Risks," Discussion Papers CRR Discussion Paper Series A: General 17, Shiga University, Faculty of Economics,Center for Risk Research.
    20. Wei-Shiun Chang & Daniel A. Sanchez-Loor, 2020. "Downstream Information Leaking and Information Sharing Between Partially Informed Retailers," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 733-760, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01889496. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.