Sale of monopoly information and behavior of rivaling clients: A theoretical perspective
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- Cason, Timothy N & Mason, Charles F, 1999. "Information Sharing and Tacit Collusion in Laboratory Duopoly Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(2), pages 258-81, April.
- Chang, Chun-Hao & Lee, Chi-Wen Jevons, 1994. "Optimal Pricing Strategy in Marketing Research Consulting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 463-78, May.
- John C Harsanyi, 1997. "Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1175, David K. Levine.
- Raith, Michael, 1996. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 260-288, October.
- William Novshek & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1982. "Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 214-218, Spring.
- Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, 1986. "Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-491.
- Richard N. Clarke, 1983. "Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 383-394, Autumn.
- Vives, Xavier, 1988. "Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 851-76, July.
- Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
- Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-589.
- Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1976. "On the Concept of the Value of Information in Competitive Situations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(7), pages 739-747, March.
- Kamien, Morton I. & Tauman, Yair & Zamir, Shmuel, 1990. "On the value of information in a strategic conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 129-153, June.
- Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 329-43, March.
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