The product market opportunity loss of mandated disclosure
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Juan-José Ganuza & Jos Jansen, 2013.
"Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 845-876, December.
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- Juan-José Ganuza & Jos Jansen, 2012. "Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly," Working Paper Series in Economics 54, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
- Kazunori Miwa, 2013. "The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure on Information Acquisition: Theory and Experiment," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-01, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
- Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2013.
"Investment in customer recognition and information exchange,"
Information Economics and Policy,
Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 92-106.
- Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2012. "Investment in customer recognition and information exchange," Working Papers 12-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Cho, Myeonghwan & Jun, Byung-hill, 2013. "Information sharing with competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 81-84.
- Kazunori Miwa, 2016. "Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2016-17, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
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