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Economic implications of alternative disclosure rules for research and development costs

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  • JOHN S. HUGHES
  • JENNIFER L. KAO

Abstract

. This paper considers the effects of different rules regarding research and development (R&D) costs on competition in oligopolistic industries. It is shown that the consequences of those regimes on equilibrium levels of R&D spending depend on the impact of R&D on marginal costs and the risk attitudes of firm managers. Further results speak to the self†selection of disclosure policies and the effects of those policies on social welfare. Generally speaking, the results are useful in forming predictions concerning the economic consequences of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 2 and in explaining the information exchange activities of trade associations in high†technology R&D industries. Résumé. Les auteurs analysent les conséquences de différentes règles relatives à la présentation de renseignements relatifs aux coûts de la recherche et du développement sur la concurrence dans les secteurs d'activité oligopolistiques. Ils établissent que les conséquences de la structure oligopolistique sur les niveaux d'équilibre des dépenses de recherche et de développement dépendent de l'incidence de ces activités sur les coûts marginaux et de l'attitude des cadres à l'égard du risque. Les auteurs tirent en outre des conclusions quant à l'autosélection de politiques relatives à la présentation de renseignements et aux conséquences de ces politiques sur l'intérêt de la société. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats de l'étude peuvent servir à l'élaboration de prédictions relatives aux conséquences économiques de la norme Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 2 et expliquer les activités d'échange d'information des associations commerciales dans les secteurs où la recherche et le développement technologiques sont importants.

Suggested Citation

  • John S. Hughes & Jennifer L. Kao, 1991. "Economic implications of alternative disclosure rules for research and development costs," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(1), pages 152-169, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:8:y:1991:i:1:p:152-169
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1991.tb00840.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard N. Clarke, 1983. "Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 383-394, Autumn.
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    8. Wolfson, Ma, 1980. "Discussion Of The Economic-Effects Of Involuntary Uniformity In The Financial-Reporting Of R-And-D Expenditures," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18, pages 75-83.
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    10. Selto, Fh & Clouse, Ml, 1985. "An Investigation Of Managers Adaptations To Sfas No-2 - Accounting For Research-And-Development Costs," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 700-717.
    11. Dukes, Re & Dyckman, Tr & Elliott, Ja, 1980. "Accounting For Research And Development Costs - The Impact On Research And Development Expenditures," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18, pages 1-26.
    12. Elliott, J & Richardson, G & Dyckman, T & Dukes, R, 1984. "The Impact Of Sfas No-2 On Firm Expenditures On Research And Development - Replications And Extensions," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 85-102.
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    1. Martha L. Loudder & Bruce K. Behn, 1995. "Alternative Income Determination Rules and Earnings Usefulness: The Case of R&D Costs," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(1), pages 185-205, September.
    2. Ricardo F. Reis & Phillip C. Stocken, 2007. "Strategic Consequences of Historical Cost and Fair Value Measurements," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(2), pages 557-584, June.
    3. Bruno Fabre, 2010. "Le rôle de la diffusion d'informations relatives aux actifs immatériels auprès des parties prenantes : synthèse et illustrations," Post-Print halshs-00525811, HAL.
    4. Anis Jarboui & Ahmed Abdelmoula, 2007. "Opportunisme Managerial, Valorisation Boursiere Et Modes De Comptabilisation Des Depenses Immaterielles Dans Les Pays Emergents," Post-Print halshs-00522296, HAL.
    5. Dennis Oswald & Paul Zarowin, 2007. "Capitalization of R&D and the Informativeness of Stock Prices," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 703-726.
    6. Kirby, Alison J., 2004. "The product market opportunity loss of mandated disclosure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 553-577, December.
    7. John S. Hughes & Jennifer L. Kao, 1994. "Disclosure Rules and R&D Spending Revisited," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 633-646, June.
    8. Salma Loulou & Mohamed Triki, 2008. "Déterminants et pertinence de l'activation des dépenses de recherche & développement dans le contexte des entreprises françaises," Post-Print halshs-00525992, HAL.
    9. Hédi Turki & Ahmed Abdelmoula, 2007. "Les Determinants Des Choix Comptables Relatifs Aux Elements Immateriels Cas Des Entreprises Tunisiennes," Post-Print halshs-00544910, HAL.
    10. Suyon Kim & Jaehong Lee, 2020. "Accounting Treatment of R&D for Environmentally Responsible Firms: Evidence from South Korea," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-16, April.
    11. Gerald A. Feltham & Frank B. Gigler & John S. Hughes, 1992. "The effects of line†of†business reporting on competition in oligopoly settings," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(1), pages 1-23, September.

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