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Strategic Consequences of Historical Cost and Fair Value Measurements

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  • Ricardo F. Reis
  • Phillip C. Stocken

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  • Ricardo F. Reis & Phillip C. Stocken, 2007. "Strategic Consequences of Historical Cost and Fair Value Measurements," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(2), pages 557-584, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:24:y:2007:i:2:p:557-584
    DOI: 10.1506/0274-9457-GP27-5215
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Amir Ziv, 1993. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly: The Truth-Telling Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 455-465, Autumn.
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    10. Gilbert, Richard J., 1987. "Investment and Coordination in Oligopolistic Industries," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt51b0f7sq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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    13. Phillip C. Stocken, 2000. "Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 359-374, Summer.
    14. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    15. Kanodia, C & Lee, DH, 1998. "Investment and disclosure: The disciplinary role of periodic performance reports," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(1), pages 33-55.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hui Chen & Bjorn N. Jorgensen, 2018. "Market Exit Through Divestment—The Effect of Accounting Bias on Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(1), pages 164-177, January.
    2. Iván Marinovic, 2017. "Delegated Bidding and the Allocative Effect of Accounting Rules," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(7), pages 2181-2196, July.
    3. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
    4. Marco Fasan & Carlo Marcon, 2014. "Accounting Tradition and other drivers of the Fair Value choice: An Opportunistic Management perspective," Working Papers 13, Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    5. Kepler, John D., 2021. "Private communication among competitors and public disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2).

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