Preannouncing competitive decisions in oligopoly markets
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Chen, Hui & Jorgensen, Bjorn, 2016. "Market exit through divestment: the effect of accounting bias on competition," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64217, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2015. "Competitive intelligence and disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 709-729, October.
- Chen, Gang & Rytter, Niels G.M. & Jiang, Liping & Nielsen, Peter & Jensen, Lars, 2017. "Pre-announcements of price increase intentions in liner shipping spot markets," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 109-125.
- Kazunori Miwa, 2016. "Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2016-17, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
More about this item
KeywordsPre-announcement; Disclosure; Duopoly; Uncertainty; Credibility;
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