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Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage

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Listed author(s):
  • Michael Kopel

    ()

  • Clemens Löffler

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00712-008-0004-4
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 94 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 143-166

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:94:y:2008:i:2:p:143-166
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-008-0004-4
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Keywords: First mover advantage; Strategic delegation; Research and development; L13; L2; O31;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
  • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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  1. Amir, Rabah & Stepanova, Anna, 2006. "Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, April.
  2. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  3. Polo, Michele & Tedeschi, Piero, 2000. "Delegation games and side-contracting," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 101-116, March.
  4. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
  5. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
  6. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
  7. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-559, August.
  8. Jianbo Zhang & Zhentang Zhang, 1997. "R&D in a strategic delegation game," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 391-398.
  9. Basu, Kaushik, 1995. "Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 459-464, October.
  10. Neven, Damien J, 1989. " Strategic Entry Deterrence: Recent Developments in the Economics of Industry," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 213-233.
  11. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-653, October.
  12. Jansen, Thijs & van Lier, Arie & van Witteloostuijn, Arjen, 2007. "A note on strategic delegation: The market share case," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 531-539, June.
  13. Matthias Kräkel, 2004. "R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 147-156.
  14. Vardy, Felix, 2004. "The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 374-400, November.
  15. Lambertini, Luca, 2000. "Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 47(5), pages 550-570, November.
  16. Brander, James A. & Lewis, Tracy R., 1986. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 956-970, December.
  17. Dixon, Huw, 1985. "Strategic Investment in an Industry with a Competitive Product Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 483-499, June.
  18. Ware, Roger, 1984. "Sunk Costs and Strategic Commitment: A Proposed Three-Stage Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 370-378, June.
  19. Fershtman, Chaim, 1985. "Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 245-253, June.
  20. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
  21. Zhiyong Liu, 2005. "Stackelberg leadership with demand uncertainty," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(5), pages 345-350.
  22. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 225-235, Spring.
  23. Michael Kopel & Christian Riegler, 2006. "R&D in a strategic delegation game revisited: a note," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(7), pages 605-612.
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Cited by:

  1. Michael Kopel & Marco A. Marini, 2012. "Optimal Compensation Structure in Consumer Cooperatives under Mixed Oligopoly," DIS Technical Reports 2012-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
  2. Nie, Pu-yan, 2013. "Duopoly quality commitment," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 832-842.
  3. Love, James H. & Roper, Stephen & Zhou, Ying, 2016. "Experience, age and exporting performance in UK SMEs," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 806-819.
  4. Michelacakis, Nickolas, 2016. "Strategic delegation effects on Cournot and Stackelberg competition," MPRA Paper 71052, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Pål Børing, 2015. "The effects of firms’ R&D and innovation activities on their survival: a competing risks analysis," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 1045-1069, November.
  6. Kopel, Michael & Brand, Björn, 2012. "Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 982-989.
  7. Sang-Gun Lee & Byeonghwa Park & Si-Hyeon Kim & Hong-Hee Lee, 2012. "Innovation and imitation effects in the mobile telecommunication service market," Service Business, Springer;Pan-Pacific Business Association, vol. 6(3), pages 265-278, September.
  8. Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2016. "Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 553-570, November.
  9. Athanasia Mavrommati, 2012. "A stackelberg duopoly with binary choices of objectives," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 843-853.

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