Endogenous timing of managerial contracts in unionised oligopolies
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More about this item
Keywordsendogenous timing; managerial contracts; unionised oligopoly;
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-07-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2016-07-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2016-07-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAB-2016-07-23 (Labour Economics)
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