A model is developed highlighting interactions between firm-level union-employer bargaining and industry-level oligopolistic price-setting, combining models of parametric conjectural variation oligopoly and asymmetric Nash-bargaining. Wages can only be bargained up if product market behavior is noncompetitive or if unions act on an industry-wide basis. If bargaining is efficient, wages are monotonically increasing in product market collusion, but the relationship may be reversed if bargaining covers only the wage. The relationship between profit markets and wages and some macroeconomic implications are explored. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 99 (1989)
Issue (Month): 398 (December)
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