Optimal Compensation Structure In Consumer Cooperatives Under Mixed Oligopoly
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- Michael Kopel & Marco A. Marini, 2012. "Optimal Compensation Structure in Consumer Cooperatives under Mixed Oligopoly," DIS Technical Reports 2012-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marco A. MARINI & Paolo POLIDORI & Desiree TEOBALDELLI & Alberto ZEVI, 2015.
"Welfare Enhancing Coordination In Consumer Cooperatives Under Mixed Oligopoly,"
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- Marco Marini & Paolo Polidori & Alberto Zevi & Désirée Teobaldelli, 2013. "Welfare Enhancing Coordination in Consumer Cooperatives under Mixed Oligopoly," Working Papers 1303, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2013.
- Marco Marini & Paolo Polidori & Desiree Teobaldelli & Alberto Zevi, 2014. "Welfare enhancing coordination in consumer cooperatives under mixed oligopoly," DIAG Technical Reports 2014-10, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
- Saha, Souresh, 2014. "Firm's objective function and product and process R&D," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 484-494.
- Richard Meade, 2015. "Incentives, Efficiency and Quality in Regulated Monopolies under Customer Ownership," Working Papers 2015-05, Auckland University of Technology, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsConsumer Cooperatives; Strategic Incentives; Price Competition; Oligopoly.;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-07-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2012-07-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2012-07-23 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
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