Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release
This article studies the fulfilled expectations equilibrium for a Cournot duopoly model in which firms acquire information about uncertain linear demand. Several propositions are established concerning the incentives to acquire and release information in this duopoly environment.
Volume (Year): 13 (1982)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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