Information exchange in a Cournot duopoly with nonlinear demand function
We study information sharing in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand function, when the elasticity is uncertain. This is one of the first attempts to analyze the role of nonlinearity in such a framework. We found important results about the profitability of sharing informations when marginal costs are high and/or the variance between elasticity values is low. From the point of view of welfare considerations, not sharing information seems to be the best scenario.
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- Malueg, David A. & Tsutsui, Shunichi O., 1996. "Duopoly information exchange: The case of unknown slope," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 119-136.
- Rodney Beard, 2015. "N-Firm Oligopoly With General Iso-Elastic Demand," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 336-345, October.
- Chokler, Adi & Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Kim, Moshe & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2006. "Information disadvantage in linear Cournot duopolies with differentiated products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 785-793, July.
- Lagerlof, Johan N.M., 2007.
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- Johan Lagerlöf, 2003. "Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-04, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Lagerlöf, Johan N. M., 2003. "Insisting on a Non-negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare and Multiple Equilibria," CEPR Discussion Papers 3901, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johan Lagerlof, 2003. "Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria," Industrial Organization 0304007, EconWPA.
- Johan Lagerlof, 2003. "Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria," Microeconomics 0304006, EconWPA.
- Richard N. Clarke, 1983. "Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 383-394, Autumn.
- Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
- Lode Li, 1985. "Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 521-536, Winter.
- Li, Lode., 1985. "Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing," Working Papers 561, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 329-343, March.
- Malueg, David A & Tsutsui, Shunichi O, 1998. "Oligopoly Information Exchange When Non-negative Price and Output Constraints May Bind," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(4), pages 363-371, December.
- Bischi, Gian Italo & Kopel, Michael, 2001. "Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 73-100, September.
- Alison J. Kirby, 1988. "Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 138-146, Spring.
- David Collie, 2004. "Collusion and the elasticity of demand," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(3), pages 1-6.
- Tramontana, Fabio, 2010. "Heterogeneous duopoly with isoelastic demand function," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 350-357, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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