Information disadvantage in linear Cournot duopolies with differentiated products
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References listed on IDEAS
- Malueg, David A. & Tsutsui, Shunichi O., 1996. "Duopoly information exchange: The case of unknown slope," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 119-136.
- Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2002. "Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 151-160, September.
- Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 329-343, March.
- Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Information and competitive advantage," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 17-35.
- Raith, Michael, 1996. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 260-288, October.
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- Dov Fried, 1984. "Incentives for Information Production and Disclosure in a Duopolistic Environment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(2), pages 367-381.
- Esther Gal-Or, 1987. "First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 279-292.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Fabio Tramontana, 2013. "Information exchange in a Cournot duopoly with nonlinear demand function," DEM Working Papers Series 049, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management.
- Marta Rocha & Thomas Greve, 2016.
"Contracting in a market with differential information,"
EPRG 1624, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
- Rocha, M. & Greve, T., 2016. "Contracting in a market with differential information," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1657, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- De Borger, Bruno & Fosgerau, Mogens, 2012.
"Information provision by regulated public transport companies,"
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 492-510.
- DE BORGER, Bruno & FOSGERAU, Mogens, 2011. "Information provision by regulated public transport companies," Working Papers 2011012, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
- De Borger, Bruno & Fosgerau, Mogens, 2012. "Information provision by regulated public transport companies," MPRA Paper 42267, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Xu, Jin, 2007. "Information Advantage in Stackelberg Duopoly under Demand Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 6408, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Luo, Jianli, 2012. "Information acquisition under uncertainty: The case of labor-managed and profit-maximizing firms coexist," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2527-2532.
- Shlomit Hon‐Snir & Benyamin Shitovitz & Menahem Spiegel, 2010. "Bayesian Equilibrium in a Public Good Economy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 387-398, April.
- Huang, Weihong, 2008. "Information lag and dynamic stability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(5-6), pages 513-529, April.
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