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Contracting in a market with differential information

Author

Listed:
  • Marta Rocha

    (Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa)

  • Thomas Greve

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge)

Abstract

This Consider an oligopolistic industry where two firms have access to the same technology and compete in prices, but one firm has access to better information about the customers in the market. We assume that better information allows the better informed firm to attract specific customers. The better informed firm obtains a first customer contact advantage, whereas the uninformed firm can only offer a menu of prices without being able to pre-identify the types of customers. We show that better information does not lead to higher profit.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Marta Rocha & Thomas Greve, 2016. "Contracting in a market with differential information," Working Papers EPRG 1624, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1624
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    price competition; personalised payment; differential information.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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