Information sharing with competition
This paper studies the incentive to share information with competition. Information sharing has a positive aspect in that agents have better prediction. However, it also contains a negative aspect because it might increase the competition. We show that, when agents have independent information, there is a negative relationship between the accuracy of information and the competitive pressure in deciding whether or not to share information. However, this is not always true if the agents have correlated information.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521784504 is not listed on IDEAS
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- Jos Jansen, 2009. "Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_36, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Jos Jansen, 2008. "Information Acquisition and Strategic Disclosure in Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 113-148, 03.
- Kovenock, Dan & Morath, Florian & Münster, Johannes, 2010. "Information sharing in contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 334, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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