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Information sharing with competition

Author

Listed:
  • Cho, Myeonghwan
  • Jun, Byung-hill

Abstract

This paper studies the incentive to share information with competition. Information sharing has a positive aspect in that agents have better prediction. However, it also contains a negative aspect because it might increase the competition. We show that, when agents have independent information, there is a negative relationship between the accuracy of information and the competitive pressure in deciding whether or not to share information. However, this is not always true if the agents have correlated information.

Suggested Citation

  • Cho, Myeonghwan & Jun, Byung-hill, 2013. "Information sharing with competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 81-84.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:81-84
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:phsmap:v:496:y:2018:i:c:p:505-513 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Bian, Junsong & Guo, Xiaolei & Lai, Kin Keung & Hua, Zhongsheng, 2014. "The strategic peril of information sharing in a vertical-Nash supply chain: A note," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 37-43.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information sharing; Competitive pressure; Job competition;

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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