Information sharing in contests
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- Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Shitovitz, Benyamin & Moreno Ruiz, Diego & Einy, Ezra, 2014. "The value of public information in common value Tullock contests," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1401, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- repec:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:36-40 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kai Konrad, 2012.
"Information alliances in contests with budget limits,"
Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 679-693, June.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2010. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-21, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Konrad, Kai A., 2012. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Munich Reprints in Economics 22072, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Andrzej Kwiatkowski, 2010.
"Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments,"
Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics
243, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
- Kwiatkowski, Andrzej, 2010. "Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-87, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Philipp Denter & John Morgan & Dana (D.) Sisak, 2018. "Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-041/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 147-165.
- Denter, Philipp & Morgan, John & Sisak, Dana, 2011. ""Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests," Economics Working Paper Series 1128, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
- repec:spr:joecth:v:63:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0974-3 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cho, Myeonghwan & Jun, Byung-hill, 2013. "Information sharing with competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 81-84.
- Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2014. "The Value of Public Information in Common-Value Tullock Contests," Working Papers 1408, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2015. "To deter or to moderate? Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2015-15, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Christian Ewerhart & Julia Grünseis, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
More about this item
Keywordsinformation sharing; contest; all-pay auction;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2010-09-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2010-09-18 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-INO-2010-09-18 (Innovation)
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