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Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results

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  • David Gill

Abstract

We analyze the incentives to disclose intermediate research results. We find that despite the help that disclosure can give to a rival, the leading innovator sometimes chooses to disclose. Disclosure signals commitment to the research project, which may induce a rival to exit. With weak product market competition, the leader discloses intermediate results that are sufficiently promising, while secrecy may be employed for very good results. As spillovers from disclosure increase, the leader becomes more secretive. With strong product market competition, the leader may rely entirely on secrecy but perhaps surprisingly invests more often at the intermediate stage.

Suggested Citation

  • David Gill, 2004. "Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results," Economics Series Working Papers 211, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:211
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    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper211.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ponce, Carlos J., 2011. "Knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights protection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 418-434.
    2. repec:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:2:p:806-824 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Rockett, Katharine, 2012. "Perspectives on the knowledge-based society: An introduction to the special issue," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 6, pages =1-22.
    4. Haeussler, Carolin, 2011. "Information-sharing in academia and the industry: A comparative study," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 105-122, February.
    5. Haeussler, Carolin & Jiang, Lin & Thursby, Jerry & Thursby, Marie, 2014. "Specific and general information sharing among competing academic researchers," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 465-475.
    6. Ajay Bhaskarabhatla & Enrico Pennings, 2012. "Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-010/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Rockett, Katharine, 2010. "Property Rights and Invention," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Elsevier.
    8. Aoki, Reiko & Spiegel, Yossi, 2009. "Pre-grant patent publication and cumulative innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 333-345, May.
    9. Jos Jansen, 2010. "STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 349-372, June.
    10. Kretschmer, Tobias & Muehlfeld, Katrin, 2006. "Co-opetition and prelaunch in standard-setting for developing technologies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19843, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Daniel P. Gross, 2017. "Performance feedback in competitive product development," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(2), pages 438-466, May.
    12. Jos Jansen, 2005. "The Effects of Disclosure Regulation of an Innovative Firm," CESifo Working Paper Series 1459, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. Carolin Haeussler & Lin Jiang & Jerry Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 2009. "Specific and General Information Sharing Among Academic Scientists," NBER Working Papers 15315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Cho, Myeonghwan & Jun, Byung-hill, 2013. "Information sharing with competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 81-84.
    15. Kerstan, Sven & Kretschmer, Tobias & Muehlfeld, Katrin, 2012. "The dynamics of pre-market standardization," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 105-119.
    16. Johnson, Justin P., 2014. "Defensive publishing by a leading firm," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 15-27.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disclosure; Intermediate Research Results; Spillovers; R&D;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L19 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Other
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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