Dynamic R&D Competition
The authors study a simple, two-stage, stochastic patent race involving two firms. They examine the behavior of the participants as they gain the lead or fall behind in the race. The authors find that the leader engages in R&D more intensively than does the follower, and that both firms intensify their efforts if the follower does catch up with the leader. They also analyze: (1) the attractiveness of licensing, whereby the leader shares his results with the follower; (2) a policy of issuing patents for intermediate research results; and (3) the effects of research joint ventures, whereby the firms coordinate their initial research efforts and share their results. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 97 (1987)
Issue (Month): 386 (June)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kenneth L. Judd, 2003.
"Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 673-695, 03.
- Kenneth L. Judd, 1985. "Closed-Loop Equilibrium in a Multi-Stage Innovation Race," Discussion Papers 647, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1981. "Dynamic games of innovation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 21-41, August.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F., "undated". "Dynamic Games of Innovation," Working Papers 287, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June.
- Tom Lee & Louis L. Wilde, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 429-436.
- Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 25-30, May.
- Christopher Harris & John Vickers, 1985. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 193-209. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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