Failing Firm Defense with Entry Deterrence
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"Bankruptcy Risk, Product Market Competition and Horizontal Mergers,"
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- Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst, 2008. "Do Consumers Benefit from Concentration in the New Economy? A Review of Google's Mergers, Acquisitions, and Arrangements," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-121, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
More about this item
KeywordsFailing Firm Defense; Entry Deterrence; Consumer Surplus;
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-11-12 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2006-11-12 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2006-11-12 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2006-11-12 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2006-11-12 (Microeconomics)
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