The Failing Firm Defence: Merger Policy and Entry
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Alessandro Fedele & Massimo Tognoni, 2010.
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More about this item
Keywordsentry; exit; failing firm defence; merger policy;
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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