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Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger

In: Handbook of Industrial Organization

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  • Jacquemin, Alexis
  • Slade, Margaret E.

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  • Jacquemin, Alexis & Slade, Margaret E., 1989. "Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 415-473 Elsevier.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indchp:1-07
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    3. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Kachel, Yael & Finkelsthain, Israel, 2009. "Antitrust Legislation and Cooperation in Fish Marketing," Journal of Rural Cooperation, Hebrew University, Center for Agricultural Economic Research, vol. 37(2).
    5. Mihail BUŞU & Bogdan CÎMPAN, 2014. "Screening Methods For The Detection Of Cartels," Network Intelligence Studies, Fundația Română pentru Inteligența Afacerii, Editorial Department, issue 3, pages 21-31, April.
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    9. Bertrand, Olivier & Zuniga, Pluvia, 2006. "R&D and M&A: Are cross-border M&A different? An investigation on OECD countries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pages 401-423.
    10. Mason, Robin & Weeds, Helen, 2013. "Merger policy, entry, and entrepreneurship," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 23-38.
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    12. Sridhar Moorthy & Ralph A. Winter, 2006. "Price‐matching guarantees," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, pages 449-465.
    13. Maia David, 2007. "Politique environnementale et politique de la concurrence," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, pages 125-138.
    14. Almekinders, G.J. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1992. "Daily Bundesbank and federal reserve intervention and the conditional variance tale in DM/$-returns," Research Memorandum FEW 554, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Kachel, Yael & Finkelshtain, Israel, 2010. "A Comparative Analysis of Antitrust Regulations in the Agricultural Sector in Israel, the US and the EU," Journal of Rural Cooperation, Hebrew University, Center for Agricultural Economic Research, vol. 38(1).
    16. Mason, Robin & Weeds, Helen, 2002. "The Failing Firm Defence: Merger Policy and Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 3664, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Michael Rauscher, 1992. "Cartel instability and periodic price shocks," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 209-219, June.
    18. Zhang, Anming, 2005. "Competition Models of Strategic Alliances," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-100, January.
    19. Manuszak, Mark D., 2010. "Predicting the impact of upstream mergers on downstream markets with an application to the retail gasoline industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 99-111, January.
    20. Liu, Chih-Chen & Mukherjee, Arijit & Wang, Leonard F.S., 2015. "Horizontal merger under strategic tax policy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 184-186.
    21. Ciliberto, Federico & Williams, Jonathan, 2010. "Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conjectural Parameters in the Airline Industry," MPRA Paper 24888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Bertrand, Olivier, 2009. "Effects of foreign acquisitions on R&D activity: Evidence from firm-level data for France," Research Policy, Elsevier, pages 1021-1031.
    23. Zhang, Yahua & Round, David K., 2008. "China's airline deregulation since 1997 and the driving forces behind the 2002 airline consolidations," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 130-142.
    24. Alexander, Barbara & Libecap, Gary D., 2000. "The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 370-400, October.
    25. Ganslandt, Mattias & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, 2004. "Do Mergers Result in Collusion?," Working Paper Series 621, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

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