Bankruptcy Risk, Product Market Competition and Horizontal Mergers
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- Bernard Franck & Nicolas Le Pape, 2010. "Bankruptcy Risk, Product Market Competition and Horizontal Mergers," Working Papers halshs-00812086, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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