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Irreversible investment and R&D spillovers in a dynamic duopoly

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  • Femminis, Gianluca
  • Martini, Gianmaria

Abstract

Investments in new production processes usually involve a significant amount of R&D, generating spillovers that lowers the second comer's investment cost. We show that these spillovers substantially affect the equilibrium of the dynamic game. Even for low spillover values, the leader delays her investment until the stochastic fundamental has gone past the level such that the follower's optimal strategy is to invest as soon as he attains the spillover. This bears several interesting implications. First, because the follower invests as he benefits from the spillover, in equilibrium the average time delay between the two investments is short, as it should be expected. Second, in case of a major innovation, an optimal public policy requires an intervention in favor of the investment activity; an increase in uncertainty - delaying the equilibrium - calls for higher subsidization rates. Third, numerical simulations show that the spillover reduces the difference between the leader's and the follower's maximum value functions. Accordingly, our model can help generate realistic market betas.

Suggested Citation

  • Femminis, Gianluca & Martini, Gianmaria, 2011. "Irreversible investment and R&D spillovers in a dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 1061-1090, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:7:p:1061-1090
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:kap:iaecre:v:19:y:2013:i:4:p:439-449 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno, 2015. "On the timing of innovation and imitation," MPRA Paper 69161, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Jannett Highfill & Michael McAsey, 2013. "Welfare Measures in Dynamic Firm R&D Games," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 19(4), pages 439-449, November.
    4. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno, 2014. "Innovation and imitation incentives in dynamic duopoly," MPRA Paper 59453, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Jannett Highfill & Michael McAsey, 2013. "Dynamic Firm R&D Games: Manufacturing Costs and Reliability Paths," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 3, pages 1-14, February.
    6. Chi Man Leung & Yue Kuen Kwok, 2016. "Real options game models of R&D competition between asymmetric firms with spillovers," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 39(2), pages 259-291, November.
    7. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno, 2016. "When should a winner take all, or pay some? Innovation and imitation incentives in a dynamic duopoly," MPRA Paper 75465, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ludkovski, Michael & Sircar, Ronnie, 2016. "Technology ladders and R&D in dynamic Cournot markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 127-151.

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