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Developing real option game models

Listed author(s):
  • Azevedo, Alcino
  • Paxson, Dean
Registered author(s):

    By mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory, an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a “game” between firms, as firms implicitly take into account other firms’ reactions to their own investment actions. We review two decades of real option game models, suggesting which critical problems have been “solved” by considering game theory, and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed. We provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications, or shortfalls in applications to date, and suggest some promising avenues for future research.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221714001179
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Operational Research.

    Volume (Year): 237 (2014)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 909-920

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:237:y:2014:i:3:p:909-920
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2014.02.002
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor

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