Equilibrium and Options on Real Assets
In aggregate, options on real and financial assets can have very different properties. Typically, the good or service produced by a real asset has a finite elasticity of demand, and developers have finite capacities. Also, the supply of options can be limited, and developers can be less than perfectly competitive. In a subgame, perfect Nash equilibrium with these properties, the optimal exercise policy, and resulting values of developed and undeveloped assets are calculated explicitly. The novel comparative statics are discussed in detail. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 6 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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