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Option Exercise Games: The Intersection Of Real Options And Game Theory

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  • Steven R. Grenadier

Abstract

While the real options approach has proven useful in providing an analytical framework for analyzing the timing of investment decisions, a notable failure of the approach has been an almost complete lack of strategic considerations. In standard real options models, invest‐ment (and exercise) strategies are for‐mulated in isolation, without considering the potential impact of other firms' exercise strategies. This paper illustrates how the intersection of real options and game theory provides powerful new insights into the behavior of economic agents under uncertainty. Introducing strategic considerations into the real options framework can lead to a rethinking of standard real option analysis. For example, one of‐ten cited conclusion of the real options literature is the overturning of the standard capital budgeting rule of in‐vesting immediately in any project with a positive NPV. Because the fu‐ture value of the asset is uncertain, there may be significant benefits to deferring the investment until condi‐tions prove even more favorable. But this result clearly depends on the lack of competitive access to the project. If firms fear preemption, then the option to wait becomes less valuable. For example, while the standard real op‐tions models suggest that a real estate developer should wait until the devel‐opment option is considerably “in the money,” competition and the fear of preemption will likely force develop‐ers to build much earlier.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven R. Grenadier, 2000. "Option Exercise Games: The Intersection Of Real Options And Game Theory," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 13(2), pages 99-107, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jacrfn:v:13:y:2000:i:2:p:99-107
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2000.tb00057.x
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    1. Dutta, Prajit K & Rustichini, Aldo, 1993. "A Theory of Stopping Time Games with Applications to Product Innovations and Asset Sales," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(4), pages 743-763, October.
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