Competitive investing equilibrium under a procurement mechanism
This paper proposes a procurement mechanism for a research and development (R&D) project, in which the stochastic nature of R&D is incorporated, and the potential agents needed to invest prior to the agent are selected. The incentive contract aims to attract the investment of potential agents through a sharing rate. By establishing the stopping time game, an optimal investing strategy for potential agents is derived. Furthermore, the investment equilibria are discussed, and the conditions under which the equilibrium represents preemption or simultaneous investment are presented.
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