Patent-investment games under asymmetric information
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dutang, Christophe & Albrecher, Hansjoerg & Loisel, Stéphane, 2013.
"Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach,"
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- Azevedo, Alcino & Paxson, Dean, 2014. "Developing real option game models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(3), pages 909-920.
- repec:eee:ejores:v:270:y:2018:i:1:p:1-24 is not listed on IDEAS
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KeywordsPatent-investment model; Asymmetric information; Real options game; Sleeping patents;
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