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Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach

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  • Dutang, Christophe
  • Albrecher, Hansjoerg
  • Loisel, Stéphane

Abstract

We formulate a noncooperative game to model competition for policyholders among non-life insurance companies, taking into account market premium, solvency level, market share and underwriting results. We study Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria for the premium levels, and give numerical illustrations.

Suggested Citation

  • Dutang, Christophe & Albrecher, Hansjoerg & Loisel, Stéphane, 2013. "Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 231(3), pages 702-711.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:231:y:2013:i:3:p:702-711
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.06.029
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    Cited by:

    1. Boonen, Tim J., 2016. "Nash equilibria of Over-The-Counter bargaining for insurance risk redistributions: The role of a regulator," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 250(3), pages 955-965.
    2. Malinovskii, Vsevolod K., 2015. "Business planning for a profit-seeking insurer under deficiency of information," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 215-226.
    3. Florin Avram & Romain Biard & Christophe Dutang & Stéphane Loisel & Landy Rabehasaina, 2014. "A survey of some recent results on Risk Theory," Post-Print hal-01616178, HAL.
    4. repec:eee:insuma:v:78:y:2018:i:c:p:123-135 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Dimitrova, Dimitrina S. & Kaishev, Vladimir K. & Zhao, Shouqi, 2015. "On finite-time ruin probabilities in a generalized dual risk model with dependence," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(1), pages 134-148.

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