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Reflexive Game Theory Approach to Mutual Insurance Problem

Author

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  • Marko Backovic
  • Zoran Popovic
  • Mladen Stamenkovic

Abstract

This paper deals with application of game theory model to insurance market. We observed a form of mutual insurance in conditions of full and partial information obtained by insurance buyers. First part of the paper defines the model of non-cooperative game, followed by principles of optimality, types of stability and equilibrium. Here, model of non-cooperative game has been analyzed under the assumption that players are fully informed.

Suggested Citation

  • Marko Backovic & Zoran Popovic & Mladen Stamenkovic, 2016. "Reflexive Game Theory Approach to Mutual Insurance Problem," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 12(3), pages 87-100.
    • Handle: RePEc:mje:mjejnl:v:12:y:2016:i:3:p:87-100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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