Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets
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- P. Picard, 2002. "Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets," THEMA Working Papers 2002-30, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lando, Henrik, 2016. "Optimal rules of negligent misrepresentation in insurance contract law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 70-77.
- Michal Krawczyk, 2009. "The Role of Repetition and Observability in Deterring Insurance Fraud," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 34(1), pages 74-87, June.
- Raduna, Daniela Viviana & Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2011. "Risk aversion influence on insurance market," MPRA Paper 37725, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Feb 2012.
- Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
More about this item
KeywordsInsurance Asymmetric information Good faith Risk verification Credibility;
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