On the Role of Good Faith in Insurance Contracting
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- A. Dixit & P. Picard, 2002. "On the Role of Good Faith in Insurance Contracting," THEMA Working Papers 2002-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
References listed on IDEAS
- A. Dixit, 1999. "Adverse Selection and Insurance with Uberrima Fides," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f5, Economics Department, Princeton University.
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- Lando, Henrik, 2016. "Optimal rules of negligent misrepresentation in insurance contract law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 70-77.
- Picard, Pierre, 2009.
"Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 893-919, July.
- P. Picard, 2002. "Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets," THEMA Working Papers 2002-30, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- repec:pra:mprapa:10874:11115 is not listed on IDEAS
- Strauss, Jason David, 2008. "Uberrimae Fidei and Adverse Selection: the equitable legal judgment of Insurance Contracts," MPRA Paper 10874, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
- Pierre Picard, 2005. "Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive," Working Papers hal-00243023, HAL.
- Rob van der Noll, 2006. "The Welfare Effects of Discrimination in Insurance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-012/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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