Continuous-time Games of Timing
We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect var epsilon-equilibrium, for each var epsilon>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.
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