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Overconfidence and conflict

Author

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  • Maxime Menuet

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [2021-2022] - UO - Université d'Orléans - UT - Université de Tours, IHEDN - Institut des hautes études de défense nationale)

  • Petros Sekeris

    (Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School)

Abstract

This paper studies the causes and duration of conflicts with a war of attrition game featuring overconfident players. We find that overconfidence is neither necessary, nor sufficient to have conflict. Overconfident decision makers are nevertheless more likely to initiate conflict, and to also remain active longer in a conflict. Our main results are that (i) the degree of overconfidence and conflict duration may have an inverted U‐shaped relationship, and (ii) the outcome of the war of attrition may be in favor of a weaker, yet overconfident player. We argue that this simple model helps understanding a host of real‐world conflictive situations.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Maxime Menuet & Petros Sekeris, 2021. "Overconfidence and conflict," Post-Print hal-03532938, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03532938
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13003
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    Cited by:

    1. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2022. "Engaging in Wars of Attrition," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 147, pages 79-100.
    2. Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Nicolò, 2022. "Learning it the hard way: Conflicts, economic sanctions and military aids," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0284, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".

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