The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
This paper provides a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes for the "war of attrition" when time is continuous and information is complete. It allows for asymmetric payoffs and an arbitrary time horizon. In addition to certain (asymme tric) pure strategy equilibria that always exist, the authors establi sh the conditions under which there is also a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria. These are most likely to exist when either the horizon is infinite or the game is symmetric. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 29 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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