A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games
This paper develops a general repeated game model over arbitrary time domain (which includes continuous time behaviour). A player is committed at any point in time to history independent behaviour for a positive length of time. The length of time of commitment depends on the way the history evolves locally. A virtue of this approach is that none of the technical assumptions of the differential formulation (e.g. Lipschitz conditions) are required. In addition, the variable response strategy formulation allows a straightforward discussion of subgame perfection.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 1990|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC