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Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Steven T. Anderson
  • Daniel Friedman
  • Ryan Oprea

Abstract

Several impatient investors with private costs C i face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V-C i . We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model's main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; usually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the Brownian parameters. Support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost. (JEL C73, D44, D82, G31)

Suggested Citation

  • Steven T. Anderson & Daniel Friedman & Ryan Oprea, 2010. "Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1778-1803, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:4:p:1778-1803
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1778
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Catherine Bobtcheff & Jérôme Bolte & Thomas Mariotti, 2017. "Researcher’s Dilemma," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(3), pages 969-1014.
    2. Azzurra Morreale & Luigi Mittone & Thi-Thanh-Tam Vu & Mikael Collan, 2020. "To Wait or Not to Wait? Use of the Flexibility to Postpone Investment Decisions in Theory and in Practice," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-19, April.
    3. Embrey, Matthew & Seel, Christian & Philipp Reiss, J., 2024. "Gambling in risk-taking contests: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 570-585.
    4. Bosch-Rosa, Ciril, 2018. "That's how we roll: An experiment on rollover risk," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 495-510.
    5. Ayse Gül Mermer & Sander Onderstal & Joep Sonnemans, "undated". "Can Communication Mitigate Strategic Delays in Investment Timing?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-033/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Morreale, Azzurra & Mittone, Luigi & Lo Nigro, Giovanna, 2019. "Risky choices in strategic environments: An experimental investigation of a real options game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(1), pages 143-158.
    7. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2014-048 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Sanjay Banerjee & Michael Maier, 2016. "Public Information Precision and Coordination Failure: An Experiment," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 54(4), pages 941-986, September.
    9. Stanton Hudja & Daniel Woods, 2024. "Exploration versus exploitation: A laboratory test of the single‐agent exponential bandit model," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(1), pages 267-286, January.
    10. Azevedo, Alcino & Paxson, Dean, 2014. "Developing real option game models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(3), pages 909-920.
    11. Zhang, Mingming & Nie, Jinchen & Su, Bin & Liu, Liyun, 2024. "An option game model applicable to multi-agent cooperation investment in energy storage projects," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    12. Zhu, Lei & Li, Li & Su, Bin, 2021. "The price-bidding strategy for investors in a renewable auction: An option games–based study," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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